Central-local governments relationship，implicit incentive incentives on local officials and economic performance by 于源
学校编码：10384 分类号_______密级 ______
学号：29020100153778 UDC_______
博 士 学 位 论 文
央地关系、地方官员隐性激励与经济绩效
Central-local governments relationship，implicit incentive
incentives on local officials and economic performance
于源
指导教师姓名：陈其林 教授








































































































































































As a big developing country, active local governments is thought to be important
driving force of China's reform and opening up. Not only did they promote the
sustained and rapid growth from 1980s, but also caused the performance
characteristics of China's economy, which is currently facing the undersupplying of
public service, the deterioration of ecological environment and natrual resources, and
the rapid expansion of local government debt. This article clarify the implicit
incentive mechanism from the perspective of Chinese principal-agent relationship
between central and local government, and then give an interpretation of that how
the local government officials affect China's macroeconomic performance.
China’s principal-agent relationship between central and local government depends
on China's institutional arrangements such as fiscal decentralization, administrative
decentralization, and rules of official governance, which are institutional basis of
implicit incentive mechanism. Fiscal decentralization makes the local government
have a clear independent budget system, who is closer to a self-financing economic
entity. Administrative decentralization makes local officials can make use of their
wisdom and talents, rule their cities and finally realize their political career revenge.
The institutionalization of official governance make the local officials’ political career
concern more clear, have confidence in their political promotion linked with their own
behavior choice.
This paper build a local government career concern model and deduce the agents'
equilibrium, which give full consideration to the principal-agent relationship in the
government organization different from the enterprise organization, including five
influence factors of three levels, the task measurability, officials’ residual terms of
office, correlation between the output of different locations, substitutability
between different tasks, and the central government’s task preference, and they are















economic performance. Under the implicit incentive mechanism, the factors above all
have enhanced the incentive to effect, which is the inner drive mechanism of
China’s sustaining high-speed growth. Implicit incentives can easily lead to local
officials be a selective agent, and the tasks of public service must make way for the
economic growth task, leading to the undersupplying of public services, and the
macro economy has the characteristics of low welfare growth. Implicit incentives of
local government officials is not compatible with the pollution controlling, making the
local government race to bottom in environmental regulation, and the high economic
growth is at the cost of high consumption of resources and environment. Implicit
incentives also easily lead to behavior distortion of local officials-- number and
investment preference, who tried to break through the fiscal budget constraints
through the local financing platform in the possible shortest time by loaning or direct
financing to provide infrastructure for local economic development, and the debt scale
of local government expand rapidly. Also driven by implicit incentives, local
government had adopted a series of rational strategic behavior, which is the main
cause of MIT thread in China.
Empirical studies support the conclusion above. In chapter 5, based on the
provincial panel data from 1993 to 2014,three econometric models are established to
study how the local officials’ implicit incentive from personal characteristics can
affect the local economic growth, the public service supply and the pollution control.
Studies have found that under the environment of multiple task agent, more young the
provincial party committee secretary is, the shorter his tenure is, the easier it is to get
rapid economic growth, but some invisible development tasks, such as the public
service and the environmental regulation. So local officials’ implicit incentive
mechanism may cause the growth at the cost of low social welfare and high resource
consumption. We also found that the institutional circumstances under which easy to
compare relative performance of local officials, and the strengthing of public service
and the environmental regulation from central government can improve local
officials’ behavior.















the relevant literatures and provide some comments. Chapter 3 investigate the
institution foundation about the fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization
and officials goverance. Chapter 4 build a local government career concern model
based on the principal-agent theory，using implicit incentives as the linkage, under
which a series of behaviors of local government are deduced. Chapter 5 give an
explanation to the relationship between economic performance and China’s
principal-agent relationship, also to the Chinese middle-income trap thread and the
empirical tests were carrying out with a provincial panel data. Chapter 6 summarizes
the full text and make some advices to coping with MIT thread, as well as put forward
the outlook for next research.
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日本 1946-1973 9.4 28
韩国 1963-1997 8.9 35
德国 1950-1962 6.7 13
中国台湾 1959-1989 9.1 30
新加坡 1961-1984 9 24
中国 1978-2014 9.4 37
数据来源：根据 Penn World Table 8.1 数据整理。






























出的比例 32%左右，而美国 2010 年这三项支出占公共财政总支出比例却高达 60%
以上，并且美国还不属于国际上公认的高福利国家。2014 年，全国财政性教育
经费为 26420.58 亿元[6]，占 GDP 的比重刚刚超过 4%的国际最低标准，早在 2001
年，澳大利亚、日本、英国和美国等高收入国家，这一比重平均达到 4.8%，哥






险最高的国家之一。《中国环境状况公报 2014》显示，全国 423 条主要河流、
62座重点湖泊（水库）断面水质劣于Ⅲ类以上的比重超过 66%，主要污染指标为
化学需氧量、总磷和五日生化需氧量；全国 470 个开展降水监测的城市（区、县），
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